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- continued high growth (10-15$ a year!) external reserve clime. 
Problems are sustainability of growth, suitable small farmer 
programme identification, employment. Drought break (in 7th 
year) will improve 1988 rural income.
- RSA costs - Excess Defence (ca $60 million a year) 4$ GDP, Excess 
Transport (RSA routes) 1-2$ GDP. Open to pressure via transport 
and raids. Loss of annual GDP growth 1$. In context of rapid 
growth and huge reserves these levels are bearable, danger is RSA 
border closure before transport alternatives and/or direct 
attacks.
- average GDP growth, 3-4$ but erratic. (Under 1$ '86, revised
estimate '87 2g$, ’88 probable 4-6$). Budgetary problem turns
wholly on RSA costs. Import constraint also turns on defence 
costs, excess transport costs plus deliberate reduction of 
principal of external debt as a policy priority. Employment 
growth (1 to 2$) major problem as is resettlement - both turn on 
low investment and low budgetary resource availability for 
reasons noted plus a very (in most cases) unenterprising private 
business community which does not respond particularly fully or 
promptly to export incentives or investment opportunities.
- Severe fiscal orthodoxy practiced (given that Zimbabwe is 
fighting a full scale war which nobody ever has done on recurrent 
revenue) as well as very cautious and selective external 
borrowing. Liberalising in sense of decreasing regulations and 
increasing incentives. Parastatal losses (4 significant) as much
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structural as efficiency problems - are subject of attention. 
Has safeguarded "human dimension”. Falling receipts concessional 
finance 198^ 1 onward.
- RSA costs - Excess Defence (ca $500 million annually) 10% GDP. 
Fighting full scale war in defence of Mozambique and its 
transport routes through Mozambique. Excess transport costs (ca 
$125 million) over 2% GDP. Foreign exchange impact ca $450 
million (65% defence bill plus cif higher/fob lower on 
imports/exports). About 75,000 Mozambican refugees - fairly well 
catered for in camps and with families. Serious though limited 
RSA and proxy attacks RSA and Mozambique borders. GDP growth 
would be 2 to 3$ higher annually (i.e. 5 to 7% total) in absence 
of RSA imposed costs.
Tanzania - 1982 onward adjustment strategy continues to make progress. 1985 
GDP growth 2.6%, 1986 3.8/6, 1987 estimate 4%, 1988 forecast 4 to 
5%. Radical reduction in real recurrent budget deficit annually 
since 1980/81. Limited export recovery so that rehabilitation 
and growth depend on late 1986 onward reversal of declining 
external resource transfer levels. Assistance rise plus good 
weather (8 5 /8 6 - 86/87 - 8 7 /8 8 after 78/79 through 84/85 bad to 
low average) has allowed moving exchange rate to a level (Sh 95 = 
$1 approximately) at which exports are profitable and on 
comparative purchasing power basis currency is undervalued 
without raising inflation rate (basically still swinging near 30$ 
a year). Lack of real prospect for major export recovery, heavy 
debt overhang, excess defence expenditure (RSA caused) are major 
problems.
- Investment has turned around but major rehabilitation backlog.
, tReal government spending ditto. During 19 81-85 extreme austerity 
on real spending there was a serious attempt to protect human 
dimension but major falls in real basic services and real wages. 
From 84/85 real health, education, water spending have risen and 
over 19 8 6 /8 7 and 19 8 7 /8 8 real minimum wages have been held 
constant (reversing 1974-85 trend). Real effective grower prices
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(whether public or parallel) have risen fairly steadily since 
1974 (except when gluts) for domestic marketed products, but 
fallen radically (with world prices) for export crops. Marketing 
board problems centre on credit ceilings (an above average crop 
sets off IMF trigger clause and/or leads to delayed grower 
payment), debilitated transport/processing and non-commercial 
(buyer of last resort/inter year stockholder) role of Grain 
Marketing Board as well as historic high cost structures. Latter 
issues are being addressed more rapidly than former. Very slow 
(if any) industrial capacity rehabilitation and utilisation 
recovery. Seeking to reschedule all Paris Club 1987 (October) - 
1992 payments at one go to 10 years grace plus 10 payment with 
concessions on interest rates (e.g. 2? on delayed payments while 
delayed). Distinct problems with Fund on exchange rate (Fund and 
for a time Bank wanted straight shift to the 'black' capital 
flight rate which is ca Sh 150 - down from Sh 200 - vs official 
Sh 95) and on enterprise bank credit needed to buy crops (IMF 
advocated not buying grain surplus at all) and to reactivate 
manufacturing. Bank relations uneven but more amicable.
- RSA costs - excess defence (ca $175 - $200 million at 1 9 8 7 /8 8  
rate of which $125 million odd direct support to Mozambique via 
expeditionary force and training). 3 to 4? of GDP and forex 
content (75? odd) ¿10? of export earnings or comparable to whole 
(post rescheduling) external debt service. Fighting a major war 
in defence of Mozambique and south of Tanzania where RSA proxy 
forces have penetrated repeatedly (if on a small scale and 
swiftly beaten back) since mid-1986. Perhaps 50-75,000 
Mozambican refugees in UNHCR camps and with relatives. Total GDP 
annual growth loss ca 2% (total achieved in its absence would be 
ca 6? a year).
Swaziland - Erratic GDP growth - negative 1985, 6-7? 1986, near 0 1987
estimate, 2-3? 1988 projection. Affected by weather (direct and 
via water flow for irrigation), sugar price and depressed state 
of RSA market. Poor export growth, food crop growth, employment 




- Recent firming of policy with caution on expenditure, incentive 
oriented tax cuts, stress on public enterprise profitability (or 
loss cuts). Concern for "human dimension" services real, 
moderate in regional terms. Not seen by international community 
as priority for assistance.
- RSA costs. Excess transport (damage to Maputo route), tariff and 
licensing shifts closing several industries, excess security 
costs, reducing cross border river flows unilaterally without 
reference Swati needs and existing uses probably total of order 
of $25-30 million a year or 5% GDP. Major refugee problem. Ca
50,000 total Mozambican refugees. Half registered and other half 
not and basically not with relatives but competing in small 
business, job and (growing) crime sectors. Also RSA 
murder/kidnapping raids on South African refugees. Annual GDP 
growth loss as a result RSA action probably 1—2% a year (without 
it total GDP growth trend might be 3 to 4$).
Lesotho - The dominant factors in Lesotho’s economy are the South African 
economy (employment, tourism, 60 to 70% of government revenue) 
and external assistance (over $50 per capita). Until 1980 
employment in RSA (officially 150,000 largely recorded mines 
contracts but estimated by the government as about 400,000 actual 
- out of a population of 1.5 million) rose and until 1986 rising 
wages (especially in mining) offset stagnating numbers. Aid also 
rose rapidly in the 1975-84 period but has since plateaued. 
1985-1987 GDP growth has been perhaps 2% a year and 1988 
prospects are similar.
- There is virtually no production base beyond small scale (largely 
sub-subsistence) agriculture not dependent on South Africa based 
revenue flows and/or inputs. Aid and Customs Union transfers 
dominate the Budget. The currency is only nominally separate 




- RSA economic costs turn on complete dependence and negligible 
(without tariff or monetary tools nor an independent household 
income nor state revenue base) ability to alter it. Thus they 
are hard to quantify. In 1985/86 a blockade (Lesotho is not 
merely landlocked but. South Africa locked) was used to force a 
change of government, murder raids on South African refugees are 
regular occurrences and there have been sabotage raids (nominally 
by proxy forces) on economic targets.
- An atmosphere of panic has built up in Malawi over the past 2 to 
2\ years. The rapid growth achieved prior to 1980 was never 
regained despite adjustment programmes under Fund/Bank auspices.
1985 GDP growth was under 2%, 1986 under 3% and 1987 under 0.5$ 
while 1988 prospects are for a fall or at best stagnation.
The causes are complex and cumulative but the ones triggering the 
crisis beginning in 1985 are excess transport costs (8$ of GDP) 
and massive refugee influx (ca 550,000) building up over 1984-87 
as a direct result of RSA aggression against Mozambique. These 
have exacerbated, a.) negative post 1980 terms of trade shifts 
leading to crisis in the plantation sector, b.) a growing 
land-shortage and c.) policies negatively affecting small (not 
large) peasant farmers and real wages. Malawi’s strategy has 
always placed emphasis on rapid growth by the better-placed 
economically (incentivated by low real wages and food prices and 
partly financed by marketing surpluses on small peasant 
production - the latter virtually unique in the region since 
1980) and (on a revealed preference in expenditure basis) a low 
emphasis on human condition public services. The refugee impact 
has fallen initially on relatives, food prices/supplies 
(exacerbated by drought reduced 8 7 /8 8 maize crop and cassava 
mealie bug attacks). Land non-availability/degradation (related 
to refugee need to be at least partly self-sustaining) has 
sharply worsened in southern Malawi. Therefore, the impact on 
the poor has been especially severe.
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Zambia
- RSA costs turn on excess transport (8% of GDP) from blocking both 
rational routes to the sea and impeding the rational (Tete 
corridor) land route. Improving indirect access to Beira and 
direct to Dar es Salaam can cut these costs - perhaps by 1/5th - 
but only re-opening Nacala and/or Beira direct rail access can 
remove this ca $150-175 million a year millstone. Excess 
military costs (including Malawi contingents now helping defend 
Tete and Nacala corridors against RSA proxy forces) are perhaps 
2% of GDP and the refugee burden hard to quantify but at least of 
the same order of magnitude. Annual loss of GDP growth is of the 
order of 3Í (partly because of rapid buildup of cost and limited 
adjustment or external resource contribution to meeting them). 
Without it GDP growth would be 3 to (vs probable -1Í to +1? 
1988).
Note - Malawi position on RSA aggression has shifted radically 
since 1986. The RSA proxy forces in Mozambique (bandidos 
armados/'MNR1) are denounced publicly as terrorists and causes of 
economic crisis. The transport and refugee crisis are publicly 
stressed and international help in meeting them sought. Malawi 
forces are fighting the proxy forces on its transport routes in 
Mozambique and attacks on them have resulted in President Banda 
summoning and denouncing RSA Ambassador. Malawi is still 
reticent about unilaterally denouncing RSA publicly. It is, 
however, happy to have its name on regional (SADCC, etc.) 
denunciations and to have presentations of need for aid to 
reduce/offset costs of RSA aggression made by 
multinational/international bodies (e.g. UNICEF, UNHCR, SATCC) 
with explicit reference to Malawi. (This is not itself for 
public use but to indicate what Malawi would now welcome - as it 
would not have before 1986 - being said on its behalf).
- has had negative real growth after 19 81 with declines in 1982, 3, 
¿I and 7. The 1985 increase was 1.5Í and the 1986 0.5Í while 1987 
output fell 0.2Í and 1988 is likely to be in the -1Í to +1 % 
range. There is a massive growing unemployment and absolute 
poverty problem, severe deferred maintenance and capacity
under-utilisation (consequent on forex unavailability for ongoing 
production and maintenance), relatively low investment and fiscal 
imbalance at a very high level. The underlying causes are, a.) 
terms of trade collapse (trend level in real terms post 19 8O 
under \ that of 1945-75) of copper (with by-product cobalt about 
90$ of exports), b.) very heavy transport cost increases from 
1965 (initially Rhodesian illegal declaration of independence 
impact, post 1980 RSA aggression against Mozambican routes) and 
large excess defence costs over same period. Very large (ca $5 
billion) external debt with high % commercial, IMF, Bank and debt 
service arrears and high % (IMF, Bank, commercial arrears) 
non-rescheduleable and/or at high interest rates (IMF, Bank "bank 
window", commercial bank) has blocked attempts to mobilise net 
inward transfers of external resources to allow import recovery 
and has thus ensured collapse of successive stabilisation nd 
adjustment programmes since 1975 notably in 1984 and 19 8 7. The 
Fund/Bank insisted upon near wage freeze (non-intervention?), 
price freeing, underfinanced/free fall forex auction policies of 
19 8 6 /8 7 led to massive social rending and riots resulting in 
implosion of (hopelessly under-financed as negligible net 
resource transfer, indeed probably negative) 1 9 8 5 -8 7 structural 
adjustment programme and deep hostility to Fund and Bank method 
of prescribing and their rigidity on timing and form/choice/speed 
of measures.
Zambia's 1 9 8 7 -8 8 interim go-it-alone adjustment approach is 
austere and has (helped by the now past copper mini-boom) 
performed slightly better than last two Fund/Bank designed 
packages. But as aid inflows are run down, arrears (ca $750 
million to Fund/Bank by end 198 8) rising and exports adequate 
neither to finance imports for rehabilitation with growth nor for 
production adequate to achieve fiscal balance or even static real 
personal consumption it is not viable beyond 1988-8 9. It is made 
even less sustainable by a fixed exchange rate becoming 
significantly over-valued as inflation remains in 20-30$ range 
(down from 60$ during "free fall auction, free increase price" 
period). [Not for publication - domestic economic management is 
unstable over time, inconsistent at any time and openly disagreed
%Mozambique
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with by many decision takers in marked contrast to, e.g. 
Botswana, Zimbabwe, Tanzania or Mozambique.]
RSA costs include excess defence spending (ca $125-150 million - 
shakier estimate than Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique, 
Botswana) or 5Í of GDP; 2-3Í of GDP excess transport costs (being 
reduced with shift to Beira, Dar routes); higher costs of RSA 
sourced imports (combined transport and credit squeeze) and 
refugees (20,000 registered, 50,000 probable total Mozambique and 
up to 4 or 5 times as many Angola).
Proxy force (Mushala gang) sabotage and terrorism in past and 
(from Mozambique by bandidos armados) present plus direct RSA 
raids on South African refugees. Annual GDP growth loss perhaps 
2% a year suggesting 3 to 4$ growth in absence RSA 
destabilisation. [I am hesitant here as in past Zambia has 
tended to mismanage windfall gains rather badly.] Human 
condition costs severe as government has been unable to protect 
health/education/water or real wages nor to devise approaches 
actually benefitting small farmers or urban informal 
self-employed/employed.
The central economic facts in Mozambique are war costs 
(exacerbated by drought) and external resource transfers. Real 
GDP is less than half what it would have been (on 77-80 trend) 
without RSA aggression/destabilisation. From 1980 through 1985 
real output fell about 5% a year. Its recovery in 1986 (1.5Í) 
and 1987 (5 to 6?) with 1988 (4¿ to 5Í) continuation projection 
are from this destroyed base level; totally dependent on soft aid 
increases (ca $400 million a year 1985 to 1988 increase including 
Donor Group and Emergency Group probable flows out of $600 
million odd annual increase at pledge levels), and are based on 
very shaky (because of war) agricultural output guesstimates 
which probably overstate. Nevertheless recovery especially in 
several cities (not just Maputo) and significant rural areas 
where security has improved (e.g. but not only parts of Tete
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which is under normal conditions grain basket) is very real and 
noticeable.
Over 1986-1988 Mozambique has radically revamped economic 
strategy and policy and been able to implement these (and earlier 
policy initiatives previously resource barred at implementation 
level) because of massive increases in external real resources to 
support production and emergency (food, logistics of delivery, 
health offset to aggression now running $300 million a year 
versus perhaps $100-150 before 1987) forex needs. Rural 
incentives (goods, inputs, services, "food for work" plus 
improved security), subsidy reduction, a realistic exchange rate, 
the beginnings of tax and enterprise management overhaul have 
been put in place. Export production (including transport 
services actually and even potentially comparable to visible 
goods) is again profitable. Mozambique remains "human condition" 
oriented. Wage increases, allocations to increase employment and 
real wages (including a "food bank"), increased goods 
availability at official or legal free (vs candongo or illicit) 
market prices and partly restored health, education, water 
services have to date meant most of poor people are no worse, and 
many better, off. Fees which did damage access to health 
services and drugs are being corrected. Mozambique views PRE as 
analogous to Lenin’s NEP or Gorbachev’s perestroika (whether the 
Bank, Fund and bilaterals see or accept that is much less clear).
But the situation is very precarious. Short lags in food aid can 
bring whole cities to hunger (e.g. when a 20,000 tonne shipment 
condemned as weevil infested/unfit for human consumption at 
another African state's port was sent to Mozambique and 
recondemned the physical gap nearly shattered Maputo's maize 
ration for a month); any fall in import support finance could 
reverse production recovery. GDP is at best $150 per capita 
(lowest in region). Visible and invisible exports are below debt 
service due after rescheduling.
RSA costs include ca $250-275 million or 12Í of GDP excess 




earnings from landlocked states; rural and urban production 
blocking by sabotage-terrorism-fear. Deaths (direct and 
indirect) attributable to the war will exceed 800,000 by 
mid-1988; over 7 million Mozambicans have been made internal 
refugees over 1980-85 by terrorism with over 1 million additional 
international refugees. Total population late 1988 15.0 million. 
3.6 million receive food relief (another 1.4 to 2 million would 
qualify if RSA proxy forces did not bar access to deliver aid) 
and 2.3 million urban population depends on food rations sold to 
them but dependent on grant imports because war makes adequate 
rural production/transport impossible. Exports are about 80$ 
(goods and non-factor services) below levels in absence of RSA 
destabilisation aggression. Growth of GDP is of the order of 4 
to 5$ a year below what would be possible in the absence of war,
i.e. for 6 to 8 year recovery period 8% or more a year would be 
attainable with peace and present aid levels.
- Angola's economy is dominated by war and oil. Data are shakier 
than for other states and the oil factor makes overall real GDP 
performance misleading. Over 1980-88 oil sector output has been 
on a 71% growth trend. Because of war the 1980-86 non-oil GDP 
growth trend was in the -3$ to -5? a year range analogous to 
Mozambique. In 1986 oil prices fell over 50$ (with only partial 
recovery since) exacerbating the collapse of the non-oil economy 
(probably -15$ a year in 1986 and 1987 and -5$ or worse in 19 8 8). 
For what it is worth 1985 GDP (oil and non-oil) probably fell 1$, 
1986 and 1987 experienced real falls of at least 6$ annually and 
1988 will show a lower (perhaps 1$ to 3$) fall. Non oil GDP is 
at less than half what it would plausibly have been in the 
absence of 1980-88 RSA aggression and destabilisation (a 
conservative estimate as it excludes massive base 1980 production 
losses from 1975-79 RSA actions).
BOP data are equally subject to misreading. Angola has built up 
substantial visible trade surpluses with what appear to be 
relatively generous visible and invisible import levels.
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In fact, the visible imports to defend Angola against direct and 
proxy (UNITA rebels) force aggression built up to at least $750 
million a year by 1987 or well over half total visible imports. 
Invisibles are dominated by the oil sector and in fact include 
capital investment costs by external oil companies. External 
debt is of the order of $5,000 million including private (oil 
sector) unguaranteed loans and trade arrears (and going into 
serious arrear despite massive import cuts since the 1986 oil 
price collapse and rescheduling by the USSR, Brazil and 
Portugal).
Angola planned an adjustment strategy analogous to Mozambique’s 
PRE (but called CEF in Angola). The 1986/87 debt rescheduling 
(along lines subsquently proposed by ADB more generally), 
IMF/Bank membership applications, foreign investment incentive 
generalisation beyond oil, joining ACP and seeking Donors 
Conference/Emergency Conference help routes analogous to 
Mozambique were all integral to this approach for which new 
personnel, policy designs and programme skeletons were in place. 
With the debt rescheduling rejected, the IMF/Fund applications 
indefinitely delayed [clearly US veto but whether this can be 
said by ECA I do not know], negligible aid increase prospects and 
South African war enhancement, Angola decided late in 1987 it 
could not risk proceeding with CEF. As not only have many of the 
measures been mothballed but key personnel replaced, the 
recreation of a structural adjustment strategy when oil prices 
recover, net transfers rise markedly and/or aggression costs fall 
will be both delayed and politically difficult. [To put it 
bluntly the failure has reinforced the old material balances, 
bureaucratic allocation, no possibility of deals with major 
capitalist powers or IFI’s fraction in the leadership and 
understandably so. The USA's open support for RSA’s terrorist 
proxy - UNITA - and apparent veto of Fund/Bank applications and 
the muted Western European criticism of these actions create a 
wholly different climate than in Mozambique where PRE won backing 
and USA denounced the proxy - MNR - as terrorist, the RSA policy 
as "holocaust folly comparable to second world war" at the 1988 
Emergency Conference and is putting in ca $150 million emergency
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and transport rehabilitation grants over 1988/8 9. How ECA can 
say this I don’t know - it needs to be said!] The very modest 
1988 Emergency Programme request for $105 million in May 1988 
probably represents a retesting of the potential availability of 
international cooperation more generally as well as a renewed 
attempt to avert starvation while cutting the grain burden on the 
balance of payments.
- RSA costs include excess defence ca 25Í of GDP or $1,250 million, 
loss of transit traffic revenue ca 2% of GDP; massive output loss 
from sabotage and terrorism (including 80Í non-oil exports). 
Direct and indirect deaths by the end of 1988 will exceed
650,000; nearly 4.0 million people will have been forced to 
become internal and over 0.5 million international refugees out 
of a total population of at most 10 million in 19 8 8. Those
receiving food relief may total 1 million and urban ration sales 
are lower than in Mozambique because much more limited
availability of food aid and logistical support has prevented 
comparable Emergency Programme creation (and because the
population is two-thirds as large) not because the need is less. 
In the absence of RSA aggression and with interim net resource 
inflow boosts (and no further real fall in oil prices) Angola 




- GDP growth regionally in 1988 after 2 to levels in 1985-87 may achieve 3 
to 3*5%. But this will be uneven with Botswana over 10%; Tanzania - Zimbabwe
- Mozambique 4 to 6$; Swaziland - Lesotho 2 to 3%; Zambia and Malawi under 2? 
(and perhaps negative) and Angola negative. Export growth (physical) will be 
significant (say 5? or over) in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola and probably 
Tanzania and Swaziland but very low in Zambia and Malawi and inconsequential 
in Lesotho (where visible exports finance under one-tenth of imports). 
Weather in 19 8 7 /8 8 (1988 harvest) has been uneven with Zimbabwe, Tanzania, 
Zambia, Swaziland, Botswana (barring some flood -!- losses) good; Mozambique 
mixed to poor and Malawi poor. Lesotho seems to be moderately good but has a 
huge normal year food deficit and in Angola war outweighs weather (which was 
apparently mixed). Food production per capita is above mid-1970s levels in 
Tanzania and clearly adequate absolutely in Zimbabwe. It may be above 
mid-1970s levels (even excluding sugar which is an export crop) in Swaziland 
and slightly below (excluding refugees) in Malawi. In Lesotho and Zambia it 
is probably 15-20Í lower (vs over 25? lower in 1984 in these cases).
In Botswana it was at least 50? lower before the drought broke in its 7th year 
in 1987-88 while in Mozambique and Angola the war has reduced it to 50 to 60? 
of mid-1970s levels. (For example, for minimum consumption levels Mozambique 
would need 1.0 to 1.25 million tonnes of grain imports and at least 0.3 to 0.4 
million of other foods in respect of a population of 15 million - it may in 
19 8 8 /8 9 receive 0.7 of grain and 0.25 of other basic food on 1988 pledge 
levels, shipment delays and pipeline arrears to come from 1987/88 pledges.) 
Food aid reduces the gap so that only in war ravaged Mozambique and Angola 
plus refugee swamped Malawi are there massive physical availability problems 
but poverty (lack of entitlement in Sen's terminology) caused malnutrition is 
endemic in all nine countries.
"Human dimension" has the highest priority in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Tanzania 
and Botswana in all of which modest gains are likely in 1988 in health, 
education, water quantity and quality and probably average real incomes of 
most poor people. Priority exists in Zambia, Swaziland and Lesotho but is 
less focussed and 1988 outturn is more problematic. In Angola war and
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hydrocarbon price collapse cost crisis management has nearly overwhelmed 
longer term goals albeit basic primary health care has received enhanced 
emphasis over 1986-88. Malawi has historically given little explicit
attention [or at any rate positive attention — ] and allocated few resources to
support human dimensions aspects. This may change on attention side, but with 
severe resource constraints further deterioration in real incomes of poor
Malawians and of health-education-water quality and effective access is likely
in 1988.
Aid and net resource transfers to the region have risen since 1985. But this 
is a combination of significant rises to Mozambique and Tanzania and sustained 
high transfers to Botswana with relatively high but not rising per capita 
levels to Malawi, and Swaziland and declines to Zambia and Zimbabwe. Lesotho 
has had a decline as - since early 1987 - has Zambia while Angola’s modest 
increase is (excluding military equipment purchase soft loans) from a very low 
level. Donors cannot be said to have provided the resource transfers/debt 
relief envisaged in APPER/UNPAERD except (barely) in the first three cases.
Certainly their performance in this sub-region is not inconsistent with Wass 
Report view that at least another $5,000 million a year is needed for 37 SSA 
members of the Bank/Fund (excluding Cote D'Ivoire and Nigeria). Southern 
Africa share - excluding war cost issues - would probably be of the order of
$1,000 to $1,250 million annually. Further, their tendency to proliferate,
resist coordination and guideline setting by the host (or to be fair anybody
else, e.g. Bank or UNDP!) and seek to impose standard global export models 
without respect for domestic initiatives/alternatives or local conditions and 
sheer bloody-minded petty bureaucratic and personal/institutional 
aggrandisement concerns erode their efficiency and are building up widespread 
resentment (even in countries always or now seen as "model adjusters" and 
verbally quite polite or soft spoken in debate with "donors"). [Note - the 
OECD Development Centre data exclude CMEA countries which seriously distorts 
Angola series relative to those of the other 8.]
RSA costs now total about $2,500 million -excess defence expenditure (65-75Í 
forex cost) and $750 million excess transport costs via RSA/transit traffic 
revenue loss (all forex cost) annually- These forex costs alone are half 
total likely 1988 regional visible exports. In the absence of RSA 
aggression/destabilisation the 1988 regional GDP growth could be 2 to 3% odd 
higher, i.e. 5 to 6% not 3%. Cumulative GDP loss over 1980-86 (excluding
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1975-80) came to $25,000 to 30,000 million comparable to regional GDP. By the 
end of 1986 it will total about $37,500 to 45,000 million (same basis updated 
Annex to UNICEF Children on the Front Line) or 1£ to 1.2/3rd times regional 
GDP and will be running at about one-third of achieved Regional GDP. For 
Mozambique the loss is over 50%; for Angola over 35%; for Zimbabwe over 20$ 
for Tanzania, Malawi, probably Zambia over 10$ and for Botswana - Lesotho - 
Swaziland less but significant. The loss of life directly and indirectly 
caused by war of aggression waged (direct and by proxy) by RSA over 1980-88 
will exceed 1,500,000 souls (same basis updating Annex UNICEF COTFL plus USA 
State Dept. Gersoney Report). With 1,500,000 external refugees (and over 
1,000,000 incoming refugees from Angola and Mozambique is other states) and 10 
million internally displaced at some point over 1980-88 plus 40$ odd 
health/education/water facility destruction, war/terrorist prevention of food 
production and war/export loss pressure on budgets "human dimension" costs are 
shattering in Mozambique and Angola and high in Tanzania, Malawi and probably 
Zambia plus (on employment and self-employment creation front) Zimbabwe.
What Is To Be Done About RSA Costs?
1. Recognition (by donors but also by states) of nature and magnitude of war
and war related costs. (SADCC, Hanlon, Martin and Johnson and UNICEF 
work have begun this process but only begun -)
2. Recognition that for Mozambique and Angola war is the dominant economic 
reality and to ignore it is as fatuous as to ignore (drought, terms of 
trade, etc.) while for Malawi, Zimbabwe and Tanzania war costs (indirect 
via Mozambique and response to very real RSA threat) they are among the 
most important macro economic parameters. No analysis and no policy or 
programme not specifically taking this fact into account can hope to be
fully relevant or adequate except by accident.
3. Meeting emergency costs - food, logistics of distribution, health, and
rehabilitation via resettlement and agriculture/rural basic services 
restoration - in Mozambique, Angola and (for 500,000 odd refugees) Malawi 
is crucial to human survival and a pre-condition for national economic 
stabilisation or recovery. For Mozambique the annual cost minimum 
(converting food from market to donor accounting prices) is (on a
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carefully done basis) about $450 million a year. For Angola it might be 
$250 million (two-thirds the population) and for Malawi refugees ca $50 
million a year. This is a continuing cost until RSA aggression is 
reduced or security against it increased. NB Food aid without transport 
(including spares and fuel as well as new equipment) is little use so 
heavily are the emergency-wracked economies eroded.
4. Transport restoration/rehabilitation via Dar, Maputo, Beira, Nacala and
Lobito corridors would save and earn up to $700 million a year in forex
for Southern African states. For about $1,500 million (maximum) by end 
of 1989 capacity can exist to re-route all (except Lesotho) SADCC states 
and all Zaire external trade now forced to use longer, higher cost RSA 
routes - even if Lobito Corridor is not by then operational. This 
requires fulfilling commitments donors have made already to SATCC/SADCC 
Priority Programme and contractors maintaining present momentum. The one 
addition (for Zaire) is stepping up Lake Tanzania rail ferry and Tanzania 
Railways main line rehabilitation to match Kigoma and Dar es Salaam 
Harbour progress (perhaps $100 million). As transport is key to RSA 
leverage on landlocked states this debottlenecking would reduce economic 
leverage over them well beyond transport costs.
5. Trade among SADCC states and with third countries replacing RSA sources
could profitably be stepped up when No. 4 is attained. The SADCC (and
1988 Special Meeting PTA) trade programmes do focus on and outline ways 
and means to this end:
a. pre-export/import finance for exports (analogous to Zimbabwe and 
tiny, prototype, Tanzanian funds) with base foreign fund to revolve
• when exports flow. Advanced SADCC proposals and tentative Nordic and 
USA interest;
b. expansion of regional trade credit by a combination of larger 
bilateral swing accounts and external finance for PTA Clearing House 
(allowing longer clearing period) and/or for national 90-180 day 
normal and 540-1080 day capital goods export credit facilities.
c. restoration of 90-180 day trade credit guarantees to SADCC states to 
offset South Africa’s clever use of up to 18 month guaranteed credit
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and 20 to 30Í price hikes to capture an increased share of Zambian 
and Malawian markets.
With direct transport routes to the sea open for many goods RSA will no 
longer be a low cost supplier. This will be particularly so if its plans 
to revise and cut payments under Customs Union Arrangements drive 
Botswana and possibly Swaziland out of it. (Probable if changes now 
mooted are attempted in case of Botswana when Botswana has access to
Beira and Maputo).
6. Energy dependence on RSA (in general at high cost and giving power to 
destabilise) is being reduced in case of Botswana (own plant and links to 
Zimbabwe/Zambia sources). Swaziland and Maputo dependence (ca two-thirds 
on RSA power) could be ended in 2 years by ca $100-150 million 
restoration/extension of Cahora Basa line to Maputo and Swaziland. 
Cahora Basa could also usefully be linked to Zimbabwe grid to lower
border area power costs and avert need for very expensive added capacity
at Wankie Thermal plant. Transmission line cost perhaps $25-30 million.
7. The security cost imposed by RSA combined with insecurity imposed by RSA 
and proxy forces is - literally killing Mozambique and Angola and gravely 
debilitating Zimbabwe, Tanzania and probably Zambia. Direct lethal 
military aid is not the only option open to donors. Others include:
a. logistics protection, e.g. armouring trains and lorries, training and
supporting (armed) railway and road police;
b. similar assistance to security features and personnel of key economic
projects (e.g. power lines, factories, quarries, plantations);
c. non-lethal (food, fuel, uniforms, transport equipment, communication 
equipment) to the (defensive) armed forces of the five seriously to 
catastrophically affected countries;
d. general production and transport operating and rehabilitation import
support grant enhancement specifically to offset part of security
cost haemorrhage of forex caused by RSA aggression;
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e. effective pressure (of whatever kind external state chooses so long 
as it works) to force RSA to halt its trans-border aggression and 
abandon (or bring back to RSA and disband) its "MNR" and "UNITA" 
proxy forces.
8. Employment losses from RSA repatriation could run up to or over 1,000,000 
dominantly falling on Lesotho (up to 400,000) and Mozambique (perhaps 
similar but with up to the same number of dependents). This number (and 
RSA’s estimate of 1,500,000 SADCC state legal, quasi-legal and illegal 
employees in RSA) clashes so sharply with the 300,000 odd figure usually 
used as to require explanation. 300,000 is the legally registered, term 
contract total (and basically those employed by members of the Chamber of 
Mines) not total nor even total legal employment of nationals in RSA. In 
the case of Mozambique the late 1987 figures are 54,000 Chamber of Mines;
3,000 other mines; about 15,000 other legal; perhaps 23,000 legal 
seasonal agricultural and 155,000-405,000 (informed guesses simply do not 
yield any consensus) illegal (some - especially rural - officially known 
to and condoned by RSA, some of over 10 years permanent absence from 
Mozambique to RSA, some overlapping the 250,000 refugee estimate) plus up 
to 500,000 dependents (of illegals and rural quasi-legals).
Analysis and pilot programmes (one by Norad - Unions of B-L-S and 
Mozambique-ILO) have to date centred on miners. Ironically these are 
smallest component and the one which while already being phased down 
(notably in respect to Mozambique) is least likely to be pushed out in 
short run because they are crucial to gold mining where they are bulk of 
long term, semi-skilled and skilled black labour force. The urban 
(largely illegal) workers including domestics and some of rural 
illegals/condoned categories are far more vulnerable but very little is 
known about numbers, home areas, skills or remittances.
Apart from building data; initial programmes are needed - RSA is 
squeezing these people out and has been for several years. (Whether - as 
with Mozambican miners - this deliberate economic aggression or - as with 
many urban workers - it is to reduce black employment problem in RSA, the 
cost to SADCC states and their citizens and the need to rehabilitate and 
economically re-integrate the returnees is the same.) In the short term 
the need is for emergency programmes including food, logistics and tools
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to create largely rural family sector self-employment possibilities for 
the majority and "food bank" type funds to allow urban employers to 
rehabilitate facilities and employ the semi-skilled/skilled minority.
Pilot programmes of the order of $25-50 million a year in Lesotho and 
Mozambique and $5-10 million in Swaziland, Malawi and Botswana should be 
planned and implemented by 1989 both to meet present needs and to have a 
base on which to build if massive expulsions by RSA do take place.
9. Exchange rates, balance of payments and fiscal balances-imbalances should
be evaluated with explicit attention to RSA aggression/destabilisation 
costs. Nobody has ever fought a full-scale war and very few built up 
defenses to guard against one with either recurrent fiscal or external 
current account balance. Surely the degree of imbalance matters but so 
does the fact of war/war-related costs as a cause. Similarly the main 
calculations on sustainable exchange rates, fiscal balance/domestic state 
borrowing requirement, enterprise credit needs should be after a 
plausible net resource transfer package and debt rescheduling is in place 
not without it with the parallel implication that the rescheduling and 
flows of quick disbursing (including emergency) resources should parallel 
(not effectively lag 9 months behind) policy changes or even be slightly 
in advance of them. Front end loading costs and back end loading 
potential benefits is a recipe for economic emasculation, human condition 
worsening, political will disintegration and programme abandonment 
especially in the context of the massive (often ignored, always 
underestimated) costs of RSA aggression and economic destabilisation.
Extra Financing Requirements
The costs of the foregoing are not included in World Bank or UN (Wass Report) 
calculations of additional resource flows needed. Nor, indeed, are they by 
any means fully included in APPER or UNPAERD. A rough estimate of a
reasonable external level of additional external resource transfers (in grants 
or IDA term loans) annually over 1988/89-1991/92 might be:
a. additional emergency aid - $100 million Mozambique, $200 million Angola,
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$50 million Malawi (refugees), $25 million other (refugees) - total $375 
million;
b. rehabilitation support for internal displaced persons and returning 
refugees $150 million Mozambique, $150 million Angola - total $300 
million;
c. additional finance to speed up SADCC priority transport projects and to 
fund key energy links - total $350 million about $100 million in 
Mozambique, $175 million in Angola, $25-30 million each in Botswana, 
Tanzania, Zambia, Swaziland, Malawi and Zimbabwe;
d. to one-half excess defence/security costs (perhaps three-fourths of their 
forex content) - $1,250 million total of which $625 million Angola, $250 
million Zimbabwe, $150 million Mozambique, $87.5 million each Tanzania 
and Zambia, $30 million Botswana, $20 million other.
These items total $2,275 million or an amount equivalent to gross 0DA receipts 
of the sub-region from DAC and OPEC economies in 1986 ($2,473 million). The 
largest country claimants are Angola ($1,050 million), Mozambique ($500 
million), Zimbabwe ($275 million plus refugee support additions). In each 
case the total exceeds gross 0DA receipts (even including those from CMEA) for 
1986. Whether a reduction could be expected after 1991/92 depends on whether 
RSA had reduced its aggression thus allowing completion of the transport and 
energy priority products, rehabilitation and economic reintegration of 
displaced persons and refugees and reallocation of some portion of the 
resources now required for defence against RSA and proxy force actions.
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III. Exchange Rates and All That
The Southern African region is not homogenous as to degree of over or 
undervaluation, sustainability or determination of rates.
Lesotho/Swaziland are on a rand standard. Therefore they are probably 
undervalued in comparative purchasing power terms. Lesotho has no significant 
visible exports and Swaziland's key actual (sugar) and potential (coal) 
exports at the moment face global gluts so exchange rate changes would not 
radically alter exports and could significantly improve the BOP only by 
cutting (already depressed) domestic demand and creating a downward spiral as 
to import linked sector production, maintenance of capital stock and new 
investment unless paralleled by massive resource inflows which would have to 
be concessional finance.
Botswana has a managed currency pegged to a (basically Rand/$ basket). It has 
used limited revaluation against the rand to hold down inflation. Because the 
dominant exports are diamonds and EEC quota beef it has had no balance of 
payments problems beyond a brief 1981/82 hiccup when the combination of the 
trough of the diamond market and peak of hoof and mouth disease caused a 
brief, well managed mini-crisis. On a global comparative purchasing power 
calculation Botswana's pula is not overvalued but against the rand and Zim $ 
it arguably is. This does hamper the (growing) manufacturing sector as to 
import substitution and exports so Botswana may have a mild, incipient case of 
the "Dutch disease".
Zimbabwe operates a managed float (basket pegged at any one time) about 
comparable to excess inflation with frequent small changes. On a comparative 
purchasing power basis the 1979-83 real revaluation has been more than wiped 
out and the Zim $ is undervalued. Except for sugar and steel (global gluts in 
both cases and need to modernise and reposition output mix in latter) exports 
are profitable. But relative to the rand the Zim $ is overvalued which 
creates export and some domestic problems for industry. Knowledge, market 
access and the rather sluggish (in general) private sector not the exchange 
rate hold back the (quite respectable) rate of non-traditional (as to goods 
and markets) export growth rate.
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Malawi1s kwacha is now overvalued on comparative purchasing power terms 
largely as a result of the massive terms of trade loss (fob export price falls 
and cif import cost rises) imposed by RSA proxy forces' cutting all rational 
import/export routes and exacerbated by recent poor weather and poor commodity 
terms of trade. Exports are discouraged by present prices and in some cases 
physically unmoveable. Whether devaluation would help much is less than clear 
- it might (on a managed float parallel to excess inflation after an initial 
moderate downward phasing) help reduce side distortions but restoration of 
rational transport access and debt burden reduction are essential to any 
lasting improvement.
Zambia's kwacha was probably nearly "correct" on comparative purchasing power 
terms when set at K8 = $1 in 1987. With high inflation and no subsequent 
changes it is now (despite USA devaluation) overvalued, i.e. K10 = $1 might be 
rational on pure cpp grounds. However, beyond the unfortunate mechanism of a 
fixed rate adjusted rarely but in large chunks it is not clear what 
devaluation alone could do. Removal of export/turnover taxes has restored the 
metal industry (95% of exports) to modest profitability (helped by a limited 
price recovery) but if the rate remains fixed it is likely to go into the red 
in 1989. Non-traditional exports are hamstrung by import constraints on 
production and investment.
The auction system was a disaster. Negative (and self-fulfilling) 
expectations of a free fall plus gross failure of external sources to deliver 
adequate or predictable flows (as anticipated) to keep the auction afloat led 
to a collapse to a grossly undervalued and inflationary (to 60% a year) K22 = 
$1 over 19 8 5-8 7. Speculation that the Fund/Bank will impose a new auction or 
a K20-30 to $1 rate holds the parallel market rate at K25 = $1. Restructuring 
to regain a plausible BOP requires massive net transfers (negligible over most 
of 1975-87 adjustment efforts including present go-it-alone one) over an 
extended period.
Tanzania1s move from Sh 16 = $1 to about Sh 95 = $1 over 19 8 6 -8 8 has been made 
possible by prior real domestic borrowing cuts, use of a managed float 
devaluing monthly by excess inflation plus a small real devaluation and 
increased external import support funding. It has therefore strengthened the 
1984-88 recovery of GDP growth and fiscal balance and not accelerated
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inflation from its 30Í post 1980 annual trend rate. Exports (including 
non-traditional) are now profitable and backed by incentives but with 
inadequate (in several cases) access to pre-export import finance. Their 
recovery remains erratic and dependent on processing/manufacturing plant and 
transport rehabilitation. As two-thirds of imports are external transfer 
financed vs one-third export financed, the dominant influence on the
sustainable rate in the medium term is the level of transfers.
On a comparative purchasing power basis the TSh at 95 = $1 is undervalued. 
Further devaluation ahead of inflation can not (in present production 
structure/condition/capacity context) boost exports much but could boost 
inflation. The retail capital flight rate of Sh 150 = $1 is down from Sh 180 
and the 'true* smuggling rate is probably ca Sh 100 = $1 (from major operator 
in candid mood plus scattered evidence). The no forex import licence system 
may well now (vs 1984) be counter-productive as it encourages export smuggling 
to reap high profits on amenity imports and snaps up remittance and expatriate 
local purchases flows which at the 95 = $1 rate could reasonably be expected 
to follow legal channels and provide finance for higher priority imports.
Mozambique has devalued radically to M 450 = $1 (from about M 30 as of late
1986). On cpp terms it is probably slightly undervalued. Major surviving 
exports (including port and rail transport) are again profitable.
Unfortunately Fund insistence has resulted in a large, infrequent cut policy 
not (as Mozambique would prefer) a managed downward float analogous to
Tanzania and.Zimbabwe. Exports have been cut 80Í by war and their recovery 
depends on security restoration (proceeding) and foreign finance (now rising) 
far more than exchange rates. In the medium term over 80% of imports will
continue to be financed by transfers so they (plus further debt burden
reduction) determine what exchange rate is viable.
Angola's exchange rate is totally unrealistic. The kwanza is nominally under 
30 = $1 while cpp might suggest a minimum of 300 and perhaps 450 (comparable 
to Mozambique). There are a series of separate markets with uncertain shares. 
Further, the candongo one is oddly self-integrated (to buy on it one must also 
sell on it). Thus 'true' price index is unknowable. This relates primarily 
to the costs of RSA's war of aggression combined with the 1986 oil price 
collapse (95% of exports) albeit the virtually fixed 1975-85 rate had already 
created serious cpp overvaluation before 19 8 6. Tentative plans to move to a
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more rational rate and rate setting mechanism were evolved in 19 8 6 /8 7 as part 
of a package including an innovative debt restructuring (along lines similar 
to subsequent ADB proposals), Fund and Bank membership, a Bank Consultative 
Group pledging conference, an Emergency (food and logistic aid) Conference 
parallel to Mozambiques, and selective de-bureaucratisation/selective 
liberalisation (analogous to Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Mozambique). With no 
response to the debt proposals, its Bank/IMF membership applications put on 
hold, no chance of Consultative Group or Emergency Conferences and a massive 
upsurge in direct (a fact agreed by RSA and world press) RSA aggression, the 
whole strategy (including exchange rate adjustment) has been put on hold or 
temporarily reversed; albeit the 1988 Emergency Conference, if successful, 
could be a first step toward reviving it.
General conclusions from the regional experience relate not to specific rates 
but to key factors:
1. external pressure for massive devaluations as a pre-condition for
considering later, unguaranteed transfer increases is counterproductive. 
It delayed Tanzanian, Zimbabwean and Mozambican adjustments, is delaying 
Angolan, and makes Zambian harder;
2. while gross overvaluation does deter exports, adequate export
recovery/growth requires massive rehabilitation, restructuring, 
pre-export import finance support so no rapid bop balancing can come from 
devaluation beyond the cpp rate or slight cpp (historic price) 
undervaluation;
3 . in the short (1-2 years) and medium (3 to 10 years) term net resource
transfers and reduction of RSA aggression costs (plus domestic fiscal 
policy) not exports (or even export prices) will dominate the sustainable 
exchange rate for Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Malawi and 
Zambia. Thus these issues not devaluation should be at the centre of 
international cooperation dialogue;
4. in the context of sharp increases in external support, devaluation can be
useful, not increase inflationary trends and be consistent with human 
dimension concerns, e.g. Tanzania, Mozambique. Otherwise it can be 
applied safely on a large scale only by a quite strong economy with a
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trade surplus or near balance, e.g. Zimbabwe, Botswana;
5. rates fixed for long periods with rare, major changes and under-financed 
auctions are clearly inferior to frequent, smaller changes (excess 
inflation plus discretionary real devaluation) as practised by Zimbabwe 
and Tanzania (and to a lesser degree because less needed, Botswana);
6. The constant harping on exchange rates by Fund (and often Bank) is 
counter-productive and inefficient in downgrading real (physical), forex 
flow and allocation), RSA aggression and debt restructuring issues which 
should be at the centre of domestic and international attention. This is 
especially true once the rate is at or about historic price cpp parity. 
Massive overvaluation i^s costly but usually requires parallel resource 
transfer boosts to correct; large undervaluation cannot fuel an export 
boom but can cause massive inflation, production loss and erosion of both 
the human condition and the political base essential to successful, 
sustained structural adjustment.
7. 8Í, 3 years grace and 3 to 4 to repay money whose arrival is very
uncertain because of multiple, rigidly imposed (or slowly, ponderously, 
bureaucratically waived) conditions - i.e. standard IMF finance - is 
totally unsuitable for financing structural adjustment over 7 to 12 years 
(realistic time frame for severely impacted economies unless overnight 
end to RSA actions); like cocaine it gives a short high and a prolonged 
down with grave withdrawal difficulties. (Zimbabwe, Tanzania and 
Mozambique share this view and the first two have drawn little even when 
they could have negotiated for more.) ESFA at 1Í and 5 + 5 years may be 
more suitable if more certain, e.g. built in "conditions" under which 
"trigger clause" targets would be eased and/or additional drawings 
provided. (At least in private the Bank fully agrees and the Fund wants 
to use ESFA to refinance the huge overhangs which can for foreseeable 
future only be rolled over - or defaulted - e.g. Zambia in region and 
Somalia, Sudan, Ghana, Zaire, Liberia elsewhere in SSA.)
8. The recent Fund and (less uniformly) Bank pressure to shift official 
rates to the most readily known parallel market ones is unsound for 
several reasons:
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a. Some rates are very erratic suggesting a narrow and atypical market;
b. cross rates (e.g. $ - Rand in Mozambique, $ - KSh in Tanzania) show a 
high dollar premium over alternative (dominant in Mozambique and 
probably Tanzania cases) trading currency. This suggests "known" 
parallel rate is really retail capital flight and/or special use 
(e.g. external magazine subscription, mail order of auto spare part) 
rate not the basic trade parallel market rate;
c. when (rarely) discoverable the "wholesale" parallel rate by smuggling
may be much lower, e.g. TSh 100 = $1 when "retail", $ note/t cheque 
rate was TSh 160 = $1 and is the logical rate to focus on in
considering official rate adjustments;
d. devaluation to the parallel rate is a theoretical nonsense. The 
technically correct approach (as Bank knows and sometimes remembers 
to say) is a volume of transactions (value) weighted average of all 
major rates not unification at the highest rate;
e. unification of rates at the retail parallel market one will rarely 
stick if there are functioning luxury import, direct mail order 
and/or capital and capital service payment restrictions. Users for 
these purposes will pay a premium above the official rate (whatever 
its level) if they cannot receive forex directly.
9. The disproportionate length of this section relative to others and the 
(perhaps) 5 to ‘\0% role of the exchange rate in needed policy measures is 
the result of the Fund/Bank overstress on devaluation and the equal and 
opposite domestic reaction against any flexible exchange rate policy not 
of the author’s view of its intrinsic relative importance.
- Reginald Herbold Green 
Addis Ababa and Lewes 
May 1988
